In some embodiments, system 200 improves computer network technology and the technological problem of cryptographic key recovery when signatures are blocked if at least one portion of the key in unavailable (e.g., when the at least one first computing device 210 is unavailable) by generating another encrypted pair of cryptographic keys and distributing these keys in the system. Even in case that a hacking attack is carried out and the hackers get access to the at least one second computing device 220, the attackers are still unable to take advantage of the stolen data (e.g., a cryptographic wallet) on their own since the at least a portion of a cryptographic key 206 is now encrypted, thereby this system may add another layer of security with a similar situation to not having the encrypted at least a portion of a cryptographic key 206. It should be noted that system 200 may prevent the requirement of having full duplicates of data as backup and/or recovery since only small amount of data, not growing with increase in amount of users, needs to be saved with the recovery cryptographic keys.

In case that the recovery private key 205 is unjustifiably published, for instance due to a malfunction and/or due to a malicious attack, the recovery public key 204 may be also revealed. Thus, all users of the at least one second computing device 220 may be able to continue operation (e.g., use their cryptographic wallets as usual) as if the recovery system did not exist. It should be noted that even if the recovery private key 205 is revealed, attackers will still need to compromise the at least one second computing device 220 in order to get access of their private key before any damage can be done.